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Abstract 
Inherent in the International and indigenous accounting 
standards is managerial discretion in the application of 
accounting methods, preparation of financial reports and 
disclosures. Extent literature indicates that almost all 
companies are engaged in some type of earnings 
management (Healy, 1985; Perry & Williams, 1994; 
Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Jordon, Clark, & Pate, 2008). 
A crucial question posed for accounting research is to 
identify the environmental conditions under which 
managerial discretion (i.e. accounting choices) are 
exercised. Using empirical analysis this paper investigates 
one of the fundamental conditions of earnings management, 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. 
When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders 
including investors do not have sufficient resources, 
incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor 
managers’ actions, which gives rise to earnings 
management. Empirical results show that the level of 
information asymmetry  index which is the combination of 
five important Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) relevant 
proxies (volume of trade, stock price variation, P/E ratio, 
number of trading days and firm age) has a positive 
statistically significant effect on the extent of earnings 
management practiced by companies listed on the TSE. 
Key words: information asymmetry, volume of trade, stock price variation, 
price to earnings ratio, number of trading days, firm age, earnings 
management 
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Introduction 
Growing empirical and systematic evidence supports the argument that 
earnings management (EM) is a common practice in the financial report of 
reporting entities (Healy, 1985; Perry & Williams, 1994; Defond & Jiambalvo, 
1994). A fundamental question posed for accounting research is to identify the 
environmental conditions under which accounting choices became available to 
managers manipulate earnings. It is obvious that managers have a series of 
information emerging from the firm and its financial condition that shareholders 
do not have that is known as asymmetry between managers and stakeholder 
including current shareholders and potential investors. This paper examines how 
information asymmetry between managers and investors impacts the level of 
EM practiced by managers of companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange 
the sole share market in Iran. 
Firm managers manage earnings with respect to several goals and motivations. 
It seems that a primary motive of EM by managers is to influence stock prices 
and manipulate company’s stock market. Information available to the stock 
market affects how investors interpret and react to the financial information 
released by firms, and therefore influence the extent to which managers can 
impact the stock market with managed financial reporting. 
In analytical models of EM, Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988) show 
that information asymmetry is a necessary condition for the practice of EM. 
Furthermore, Schipper (1989) suggests the need for empirical work which 
considers the information environment surrounding the practice of EM. This 
study hypothesize that the level of information asymmetry between managers 
and the stock market has a meaningful impact on the magnitude of EM. The 
reason is that when information asymmetry is high, investors do not have the 
necessary information to undo the manipulated earnings for their decision 
making needs (Richardson, 2000). 
Test results suggest a significant, positive relationship between the composite 
score of information asymmetry (which is a combination of five important and 
relevant proxies of information asymmetry) and EM after controlling for other 
previously documented determinants of EM. The result is consistent with the 
view that the greater information asymmetry between managers and the stock 
market and other company’s external parties collectively, the more likely the 
firm is to manage earnings.  In this paper, EM is captured through accruals 
manipulation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents review of the 
literature including the relationship of information asymmetry and EM from 
information and opportunistic perspectives of EM. Measuring two components 
of the study (i.e. information asymmetry and EM) are presented as component 
of the methodology in section three along with statistical model for hypothesis 
testing. Empirical results (descriptive and hypothesis testing) are discussed in 
the fourth section which follows by conclusion and discussion as the last 
section. 
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Literature Review and hypothesis development 
In the absence of published research results about Iranian information 
asymmetry, this paper consider to brow a background of the study in this area 
using world and regional literature. While the stock market in Iran is yet to be 
developed, most of listed companies are not consider this market a prime source 
of funding.  
The primary role of financial statements is to report a company’s financial 
information to internal and external financial statement users in a timely and 
reliable manner. A controversial component of these annual reports is 
accounting earnings and financial and non-financial data about corporate 
governance. Some major decisions that are shaped by available information in 
annual reports are: executive compensation, debt covenants, capital rising, and 
perhaps most importantly, for external investors to make investment decisions. 
Ideally, the reported earnings should reflect a firm’s underlying operating 
economics and facilitate efficient resource allocation within the firm. However, 
due to the control advantages that managers have over external information 
users in collecting and reporting firm specific information managers have the 
opportunity to present earnings in a manner that is most supportive to their 
financial reporting discretion. Commonly referred as managing the earnings, 
this topic is of considerable interest to academics and practitioners. 
In a perfect market, there is no role for financial disclosures and thus no demand 
for accounting discretion (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978 1986; Holthausen & 
Leftwich 1983). However, with market imperfections such as information 
asymmetry, financial reporting is necessary for efficient contracting. However, 
due to the inherent advantage of asymmetric information and flexibility 
afforded in reporting, wealth can be transferred from stakeholders to managers.  
There are two major perspectives in the field of EM. The opportunistic 
behaviour perspective, first enunciated by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), holds 
that managers take the opportunity to manage earnings in order to maximize 
their own utilities at the expense of the contracting parties and stakeholders. On 
the contrary, the second perspective, the signalling or information perspective 
that stems from the work by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), proposes that 
managers exercise discretion in order to communicate inside information to 
outside investors to help investors predict and form expectations regarding the 
firm’s future performance.  
But the main argument here is that apart from incentives of EM (good or bad, 
dark or white and opportunistic or informative); there must be some extent of 
information distance between managers and the market for practicing EM by 
managers. More information available about the firm (less information 
asymmetry) may help investors distinguish the managed component of reported 
earnings from the pre-managed numbers, and therefore may make EM more 
transparent. There are two consequences associated with greater ability of the 
market to detect EM. The first consequence is that it diminishes the potential 
benefit of EM because the managed components are less likely to impact on 
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financial statement users. The second consequence is that it may increase the 
expected costs of managed earnings (such as legal liability, disputes with the 
auditor, reputation loss and even pecuniary punishment). 
Literature of information asymmetry indications that both sets of incentives of 
EM (opportunistic behaviour and the information perspective) show a positive 
relationship with information asymmetry, the explanation for each relationship 
differs under each incentive condition as discussed in the following sections. 
 
Information asymmetry and earnings management: information 
perspective 
The information perspective of EM suggests that accounting choices are 
made to reveal managers’ expectation about the future performance of the firm. 
For example, managers may smooth earnings to communicate a firm’s 
permanent earnings. Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (1995), Collins and Deangelon 
(1990), and Subramanyam (1995) all find empirical evidence consistent with 
this information perspective of EM. Hunt et al. (1995) argue that information 
asymmetry must exist between the managers and firm shareholders for 
managers to have incentives to make informative disclosures to the market. 
Without such an information gap, there would be no benefit to smoothing 
earnings, especially given the potential costs of practicing EM. 
Likewise, previous research has demonstrated that information asymmetry 
translates into higher transaction costs for trading shares of the firm which, in 
turn, raises the required rate of return and lowers the current stock price. Bartov 
and Bodnar (1996) argue that value-maximizing managers have incentives to 
choose more informative disclosures to reduce the degree of information 
asymmetry among market participants. Moreover, Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) suggest that informative disclosures level the playing field for investors, 
which improves liquidity. An implication of the Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) model is that the firms with the highest level of information asymmetry 
stand to gain the most in liquidity (and therefore prices) from more informative 
disclosures. Given these arguments, it is hypothesized that the greater the level 
of information asymmetry, the greater is the expected magnitude of EM under 
an information perspective. 
 
Information asymmetry and earnings management: opportunism 
perspective 
Another incentive to engage in EM is that managers opportunistically 
adjust earnings to transfer wealth from shareholders to themselves or mislead 
them. Schipper (1989, p.92) defines EM under this incentive condition as “the 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain”. An example of this type of opportunistic 
EM would be the manipulation of earnings to maximize management bonuses 
or compensation (Healy 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995). 
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In two analytical models, Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988), rely on 
this persistent information asymmetry (or blocked information condition) as a 
condition for practicing EM. For example Dye (1988) assumes an overlapping 
generation of owners, where the selling shareholders wish to sell to a set of 
buying shareholders. The selling shareholders instruct management to follow a 
certain EM strategy to create a favourable impression on the buying group. In 
this model, the inability to undo the EM is due to asymmetric information. 
Therefore, a condition which must be met for EM to exist in these analytical 
models is that the information asymmetry persists throughout the transactions. 
There is some outstanding empirical research which examines the impact of 
information asymmetry on the level of EM. Richardson (2000) conducted an 
empirical investigation of the relationship between information asymmetry and 
EM predicted by Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988). His empirical 
results suggest a systematic relationship between the magnitude of information 
asymmetry and the level of EM in a broad sample setting around seasoned 
equity offerings. In fact he shows the significant effect of information 
asymmetry on both types of EM: accounting EM (accruals manipulation) and 
real EM (cutting R&D expenditures). Following the work of Richardson (2000), 
Cheng (2006) examines if EM is positively related to information asymmetry in 
different environments. Moreover, he tried to understand the differences in 
cultural and business factors between the east and the west. The results show 
that holding information may have “value” since information asymmetry can 
benefit those firms that undertake EM. He concludes that information 
asymmetry has a statistically significant impact on the level of EM practiced by 
Taiwanese companies. He believes that information asymmetry in Taiwan is 
higher than that in the west so that Taiwanese managers’ EM behaviour may 
have a greater effect on their firms’ stock prices.  
Kang, Palman, and Sudit, (2009) examine the effect of business news coverage 
on EM in the USA. They empirically investigate whether a firm’s information 
environment such as the degree of information asymmetry, business news 
coverage, and analyst coverage affects EM. Using 35,352 firm-years and 
105,604 news items from the Wall Street Journal for firms traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ markets over 11 years from 1994 to 2004, they find 
empirical evidence that the magnitude of EM is positively associated with the 
level of information asymmetry and negatively associated with analyst 
coverage. News coverage, interestingly, has a positive relationship with the 
magnitude of EM, indicating that a greater number of news releases generate 
more motivation for managers to engage in EM. Their results also suggest that 
the effects of a firm’s information environment on EM are stronger for firms 
engaging in income-increasing manipulation than firms engaging in income-
decreasing manipulation. 
Considering above literature and take into account the purpose of this study that 
is to investigate the relationship between information asymmetry and EM in the 
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Iranian context (listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange are considered 
as field of the study) therefore the hypothesis of the paper is as follows: 
The magnitude of information asymmetry has a statistically significant 
effect on the level of earnings management. 
 
Methodology 
Methodology of this paper includes measurement of information 
asymmetry and EM in the following sections. Statistical model of the study is 
developed based of the hypothesis that presented in the previous section.  
 
Measuring information asymmetry 
Several proxies have been implemented in the literature to measure the 
concept of information asymmetry. Most of them are not usable with respect to 
the socio-economic environment of companies listed on the TSE board. For 
example bid-ask spreads and analysts’ related variables (such as the number of 
analysts following particular securities and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts) are 
the most commonly used measures for information asymmetry in the previous 
literature. Neither of them is applicable in the Iranian capital market context. 
Because a considerable number of firms listed on the TSE experienced massive 
sell or buy waiting lists during the last decade. Therefore there were no selling 
prices in the TSE trading system and therefore such variable cannot be used. 
Furthermore because of shortage of market makers on the TSE this variable is 
not similar to ones used in other sophisticated financial markets. Therefore we 
cannot rely on the registered bid or ask prices in the trading system because 
some of major stockholders or even few existing market makers manipulate 
proposed prices to achieve their goals, or the prices are missing. It should be 
mentioned that TSE is one of the emerging and thin capital markets in the world 
and it does not have sufficient depth and liquidity to adjust and ignoring the 
artificial proposed pricing, especially in the case of major and institutional 
stockholders which are completely dominant in the market. 
On the other hand we cannot use the analysts’ related variables for measuring 
the level of information asymmetry in the TSE listed companies because there is 
no database or archive for the nature, number and estimations of financial 
analysts available for researchers. 
Consequently with respect to the above considerations and related literature we 
choose five proxies for measuring the extent of information asymmetry for TSE 
listed companies. These variables are selected with respect to the unique socio-
economic condition of the Iranian stock market and the related literature. These 
five proxies are explained in the following paragraphs: 
Volume of Trade: Frequently traded stocks usually have more available 
information. On the contrary, less frequently traded stocks tend to have less 
relevant information. Thus there is an inverse relationship between trading 
volume and information asymmetry. Since there are various measures of trading 
volume, we choose one commonly accepted standardized measure. Trading 
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volume is affected by the number of outstanding shares, so this research uses 
turnover instead. Turnover is defined as trading volume divided by outstanding 
shares (See Lo and Wang (2000) for a systematic description of different 
measures of trading volume). Share turnover is also a measure of liquidity, it 
captures the willingness of investors to buy and to sell stocks. This willingness 
to transact in firm shares should be inversely related to the existence of possible 
information. Mohd (2005),  Leuz & Verrechia (2000), Roulstone (2003) and 
bartov and bodnar (1996) used this variable as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. 
Volatility of Stock Prices: Following Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson (1985), 
Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999), this study adopts the residual volatility in daily stock returns as the 
proxy for information asymmetry. We measure this proxy as the dispersion in 
the market adjusted daily stock returns in the year. If the investors and the 
firm’s managers are equally well-informed about the economy-wide factors 
influencing the firm’s value, then the residual volatility in the firm’s stock 
returns captures the information asymmetry between the investors and the 
managers about firm-specific information. Stock expected returns are fraught 
with different levels of uncertainty in prediction. The higher the level of 
information asymmetry confronting the investors, the greater the probability of 
inaccurate prediction of the expected stock returns by them, therefore it is 
expected that firms with higher information asymmetry about their value to 
have higher residual volatility in their stock returns. 
P/E Ratio: Researchers such as Javid & Ahmad (2009), Smith and Watts (1992) 
and Chung and Charoenwong (1991) used this variable as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. They argue that the degree of information asymmetry 
is larger for firms with significant growth opportunities, since managers of high 
growth firms have privileged knowledge about the firm’s investment 
opportunities and insights in the expected future cash flows from their firm’s 
existing assets. Resulting from this reasoning, a firm’s set of investment 
opportunities is used as a proxy for information asymmetry. One of the most 
commonly used proxies to measure a firm’s growth and investment 
opportunities is the price to earnings ratio. Some previous scholars have used 
market to book value as a proxy of growth opportunities and therefore it can be 
used as an information asymmetry proxy. However this study did not select this 
metric because there is considerable systematic error in this variable in the 
Iranian context. Iranian economic has experienced a high amount of inflation in 
the last two decades and consequently the reported book values are based on 
historical costing that are much lower than market values. Although the national 
accounting standards allow for reassessment of fixed assets the large majority of 
firms do not adjust their assets for inflation due to tax considerations that 
indicating the positive amount of reassessment is subject to tax. So we use Price 
to Earnings ratio as an indicator of the growth opportunities and one of 
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information asymmetry proxies which do not have inflation related systematic 
error.  
Number of Trading Days: This measure is one of the TSE specific measures of 
information asymmetry. Usually when some specific events are occurring for a 
listed firm (such as EPS adjustment news, calling a stockholders’ meeting, and 
capital raising) the stock trading activity of that firm will be closed by stock 
exchange commission until the situation is clear and the related information is 
distributed. This procedure is done by legal authorities for protecting the 
individual investors. Furthermore, a shortage or even lack of necessary 
information about the listed firms may cause trading activity to be stopped. In 
this way when a company does not present sufficient information to be 
distributed by the stock exchange commission, its trading activity will be 
terminated until the information flow situation becomes normal. Nevertheless 
stopping the share trading activity of listed firms implies that there is some 
extent of information asymmetry between internal managers and external 
investors. So the number of firm’s stock trading days is a meaningful and 
relevant proxy for information asymmetry in the socio-economic condition of 
the TSE. More trading days for a firm means that the situation of information 
flow is normal and the level of information asymmetry is less. It is assumed that 
more information surrounding companies which their stocks are traded more 
often. 
Firm Age: Some researchers such as Leary and Roberts (2007) and Krasker 
(1986) have used firm age for a measure of information asymmetry. Older firms 
may face less information asymmetry because they tend to be more mature 
firms, have established and time-tested disclosure policies and practices, and 
receive more attention from the market and regulators (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Harris, 1994). This proxy is measured as the number of years 
from the date of the company first listing on the TSE. 
Although the previous studies have suggested various measures of information 
asymmetry the literature lacks a firm consensus on the optimal measure(s) of 
the information asymmetry concept. Most empirical papers focus on one or two 
variables to measure asymmetric information. These measures usually are 
correlated with each other but each contains unique information. In this paper, a 
comprehensive measure by constructing an index of asymmetric information 
based on the various dimensions of the concept is implemented. Similar to 
Drobetz et al. (2009), his study creates a composite index based on the five 
mentioned information asymmetry benchmarks. The information asymmetry 
index (IA-index) that is developed in this paper, is based on the percentile 
rankings of each proxy. In order to construct the information asymmetry index, 
first firm’s quintile ranking over all firms for each dimension of information 
asymmetry in a given year is calculated. It is considered that higher score 
indicates a greater degree of information asymmetry. For example, a firm 
obtains a score of 5 (1) if it belongs to the smallest (largest) firms in a given 
year. Then add up the ranks along all five dimensions of information 
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asymmetry. Therefore, the largest (smallest) value the variable IA-index can 
take is 25 (5) for the firms with the highest (lowest) degree of information 
asymmetry. Table 1 and the diagram 1 in the result section of the paper show 
descriptive statistics for the information asymmetry index. 
 
Measuring earnings management 
According to Ronen and Yaari (2008) EM is a collection of managerial 
decisions that may result in reporting untrue short-term value-maximizing 
earnings as preserved by management. EM can be Beneficial: it signals long-
term value; Pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; Neutral: it reveals 
the short-term true performance. The managed earnings result from taking 
production/investment actions before earnings are realized, or making 
accounting choices that affect the earnings numbers and their interpretation after 
the true earnings are realized. 
Most of the previous research studies have measured EM by using 
“discretionary accruals” (which means accounting based EM). Therefore this 
paper focuses on the same accounting based EM which means considering 
accruals behaviour. Accruals arise when there is a discrepancy between the 
timing of cash flows and the timing of the earnings recognition of the 
transaction. Non-discretionary accruals are accruals that arise from transactions 
made in the current period that are normal for the firm given its performance 
level and business strategy, industry conventions, macro-economic events, and 
other economic factors. Discretionary accruals are accruals that generate from 
transactions made or accounting treatments chosen in order to manage earnings 
(Ronen and Yaari 2008).  
Jones (1991) offers a model to help identify firms that manage earnings. The 
objective of this model is to segregate expected (normal or nondiscretionary) 
accruals, and the difference (residual) is described as managed (or 
discretionary) accruals. The measure of the managed accounting accrual used in 
this research is estimated using the Jones model as modified by Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley (2004), i.e., it is the residual in the below model: 
tttt
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
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0
1
 
 (Regression 1) 
 
In Regression (1), the total accruals (TACC); change in sales (ΔSales); and 
gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) are each deflated by the beginning-
of-year total assets. Total accruals are net income minus operating cash flow.  
Return on assets (ROA) is added as an additional control variable, because 
previous research finds that the Jones model is not precisely specified for well-
performing or poorly-performing firms (Dechow, Hutton & Sloan, 1996; 
Kothari, Leone & Wasley, 2004).  
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To employ a large number of observations, we run the regression on all firms in 
the same industry each year (cross-section approach). The non-discretionary 
accruals (NDACC) are the fitted values of Regression (1) and the discretionary 
accruals (DACC) which is the measure of the level of EM, are the deviations of 
total accruals from non-discretionary accruals (DACC = TACC – NDACC). 
This study did not use real earnings management (REM) due to unavailability 
of necessary information in the Iranian financial market. Literature of REM 
shows extensive use of REM which is defined as changing the time of 
transactions (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005) or altering operating, financing, and 
investing activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Xu, Taylor, and Dugan, 2007) in 
financial reporting of many companies from almost all countries around the 
globe (Xu, Taylor, and Dugan, 2007). The end result of REM and EM are 
aiming the same, misleading external users of published financial information. 
 
Statistical model for hypothesis testing  
Obviously, information asymmetry between firm managers and 
investors is not the sole determinant of managers’ accounting choices. Two 
important incentives for managing earnings are to reduce political costs and 
avoid violating debt covenants. Past research suggests that political process 
theory has implications for the determination of accounting choices (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978). For example, Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) suggest that 
political costs increase with firm size and with firm risk. Managers of large 
and/or high risk firms, therefore, have greater incentives to exploit the latitude 
in accounting to reduce these political costs. Firm size, the firm’s market to 
book ratio, and sales growth are used as proxies for a firm’s size and risk. 
Moreover, Sweeney (1994) shows evidence that managers are more likely to 
exploit the latitude in accounting the closer the firm is to binding debt 
covenants.  Therefore, a firm’s debt to equity ratio is used as proxy for the 
firm’s proximity to binding debt covenants. Considering the past research in 
this area, this study anticipated that the level of EM will increase as the level of 
firm leverage and risk increase. Apart from the positive theory implication of 
firm size, the size of firm may also be capturing a firm’s information 
environment and could exhibit a negative relationship with the level of managed 
accruals. The existing empirical literature about the impact of size on the 
magnitude of EM also shows mixed results (both negative and positive effect). 
Therefore, this study does not attempt predicting the sign of the relationship 
between firm size and the level of EM. 
Using IA-index as a composite measure of information asymmetry between the 
firm and the market, this study suggests the following model to examine the 
relationship between EM and information asymmetry: 
ittitititititi GROWTHSIZEMKTBVDEBTIAindexDACC   ,5,4,3,2,10,
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In the above model, DACC is the discretionary (managed) accounting accruals 
under modified Jones model as modified by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2004) 
using the cross-section estimation approach. IA-index is the information 
asymmetry index which is measured by compositing five important and relevant 
proxies (volume of trade, stock price variation, P/E ratio, numbers of trading 
days, and firm age) as explained before. DEBT is the ratio of long-term debt 
divided by the book value of equity, and MKTBV is market capitalization 
divided by the book value of equity.  In this model SIZE is natural log of the 
market capitalization and GROWTH is net revenues for the current year less net 
revenues for the previous year scaled by net revenues for the previous year. 
The test of the research hypothesis will be performed by estimating 1 . It is 
anticipated that an 1  that is significantly greater that zero would provide 
evidence of a positive effect of information asymmetry level on the magnitude 
of EM. 
 
Sample selection 
The population of this study consists of all Iranian non-financial firms 
listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange over 9 years (2000 to 2008).  Sample firms 
should satisfy two criteria of 1) listed at TSE from 2000 to 2008 with no 
delisting record and 2) The end of company’s fiscal years should be at 20 March 
of each year (This is the date that set as end of fiscal year because according to 
the Iranian calendar year usually begins within a day of 21 March of the 
Gregorian calendar). 
Based on the above criteria, 119 firms are selected for data collection. 
Following other research studies in the same area, holding, financial, and 
insurance firms are excluded because these industries are subject to a different 
regulatory regime that likely have fundamentally different cash flow and accrual 
processes. Firms with incomplete financial reporting over the period of the 
study have been excluded from the data base. It should be added that there is 
one more filter for selecting the final sample of the study which is related to the 
estimation of firms’ EM level. For estimating the extent of EM using the cross-
section estimation approach of the modified Jones model, there must be at least 
six firms in each industry in a given year. However some groups of industry-
year in TSE do not meet this criterion. So the firm-year observations belonging 
to those industry-year groups were deleted from the final sample of the study. 
Ultimately there are 1022 firm-year observations spread across 10 industries 
which are available for statistical analysis required for hypothesis testing. 
It should be mentioned that market and accounting data needed to compute the 
research variables are obtained from existing Iranian databases and TSE reports 
on DVDs. 
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Empirical results 
Results are presented in two sections of descriptive and regression 
analysis (hypothesis testing) which the resent section presents results of running 
the study model. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the information about central parameters and distribution 
of all of the variables.  This table presents 1022 firm-year observations which 
are derived from 119 firms over nine years. The table shows that all of the 
variables have positive skewness but with respect to size of sample which is big 
enough, the normality matter can be forgotten. With respect to the table 1 it is 
obvious that the mean of IA-index is around 15 and the max and min are 25 and 
6 respectively.  
Table 1: descriptive statistics of used variables 
  
IA-
index SIZE MKTB 
GROW
TH DEBT DACC 
Mean 14.8679 11.4637 4.4099 0.4351 0.1563 0.5846 
Median 15.0000 11.4140 2.4000 0.2714 0.1881 0.0562 
Maximum 25.0000 13.3639 
130.830
0 13.4363 7.9814 87.2303 
Minimum 6.0000 9.7849 
-
135.100
0 -7.6059 
-
160.055
3 0.0001 
Std. Dev. 3.9630 0.6372 8.8841 1.0928 5.1174 4.1698 
Skewness 0.0922 0.3903 1.0313 3.2277 -30.1949 13.2865 
Kurtosis 2.3713 3.0556 
111.047
6 38.3667 
942.582
1 
226.502
2 
Sum 
15195.0
000 
11715.8
700 
4506.88
00 
444.621
7 
159.709
6 
597.488
3 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
16035.1
700 
414.608
9 
80583.8
500 
1219.37
60 
26737.3
100 
17752.4
500 
Observati
ons 
1022.00
00 
1022.00
00 
1022.00
00 
1022.00
00 
1022.00
00 
1022.00
00 
Cross 
sections 
119.000
0 
119.000
0 
119.000
0 
119.000
0 
119.000
0 
119.000
0 
 
Diagram 1 provides summary statistics for firms depending on their information 
asymmetry index. The data is pooled across the entire sample period. The 
distribution of scores reported in the diagram shows that most of the 
observations are clustered around IA-index between 10 and 20, indicating that a 
majority of the firms have conflicting individual information asymmetry 
signals. Hence, there is benefit in aggregating the signals. There are however, a 
sufficient large number of firms with high scores (134 firm-years with scores 
higher or equal to 20, the fifth quintile) or with low scores (159 firm-years with 
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scores lower or equal to 10, the first quintile). As it can be seen in this diagram 
the distribution of information asymmetry indexes are bell shaped similar to 
other social phenomena. 
Diagram 1: distribution of information asymmetry index (IA-index) 
 
 
Hypothesis testing 
This study uses panel data regression model to extract the results. In 
order to select the appropriate method of estimation among OLS the pooled 
model, Fixed Effects (FE), and Random Effects (RE), the Chow and Hausman 
tests using Eviews 7 (For more details about panel data technique and the 
related tests, see Baltagi, 2008, Hsiao, 2005 and Gujarati, 2004) is applied. 
Tables 2 and 3 present Chow and Hausman tests for the used model 
respectively. The Chow test is a test for choosing between simple pooled OLS 
regression and panel data analysing. The results show that panel data analysis is 
the suitable model. 
Also, to decide between fixed or random effects, the Hausman test can be run 
where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the 
alternative fixed effects (see Green, 2008). Based on information in Table 3, the 
suitable approach is random effects. So the regression model through panel data 
analysis with random effect procedure is performed. 
Table 2: Chow test results 
Model 
Chow test statistic P-VALUE 
Cross-section 
 F 
Cross-section 
 Chi-square 
Cross-section 
 F 
Cross-section 
 Chi-square 
Main 
model 
5.4689 553.4464 0000 0.0000 
 
Table 3: Hausman test result 
Model Hausman statistic P-VALUE 
Main model 1.6960 0.8894 
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The results of running the main regression model of research after considering 
the suitable procedures are presented in Table 4. With respect to the table 4 
results, the coefficient of IA-index is positive and statistically significant with 
the expected sign. This means that there is a significant relationship between 
information asymmetry and EM and that information asymmetry has a 
significant effect on the magnitude of EM practiced by managers of TSE listed 
companies. In addition SIZE has a negative and significant effect on EM. This 
result implies that smaller firms manage their earnings more than others. As it is 
shown in table 4 there is no statistically significant relationship between other 
used control variables and EM magnitude. The F statistic indicates that all the 
coefficients of model are different than zero and the model is statistically 
significant. The R-squared shows that 34% of variance of dependent variable 
explained by variation in the independent variables.  
Table 4: hypothesis testing results 
variables 
 
tneiciffoc Sig 
c 
IA_INDEX 
SIZE  
MKTBV   
GROWTH  
DEBT   
 
2.3180 
0.0508 
0.2156-  
0.0030-  
0.0059-  
0.0074-  
0.0313 
0.0393 
0.0279 
0.1788 
0.8451 
0.4081 
statistic F 
SIG  
R
2 
R
2 adjusted 
statistic DW 
5.3703 
0.0000 
0.4238 
0.3449 
1.9118 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
The two principles of financial reporting (i.e. relevance and reliability) 
directly reflect the role of accounting information and are aimed to resolve the 
fundamental problem of information asymmetry. The released information is 
relevant information with respect to firm’s future prospects, and is reliable 
information free of managerial manipulation. Where financial disclosure and 
judgements initially are aimed to reduce the information asymmetry between 
managers and outsiders, it has been increasingly argued that managers’ ability 
in exercising discretion is likely to impose costs on the users of accounting 
information. Dye (1988) and Trueman & Titman (1988) point out that the 
existence of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is a 
necessary condition for EM. Schipper (1989) also highlights the condition for 
EM being the persistence of asymmetric information. This research scrutinise 
the effect of information asymmetry on the level of EM practiced by TSE listed 
companies. This is accomplished by employing five proxies (i.e. volume of 
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trade, stock price variation, P/E ratio, numbers of trading days and firm age) for 
measuring information asymmetry which are suitable and applicable with 
respect to the socio-economic environment of the TSE.  The empirical results 
show that the information asymmetry index (IA-index) which is a composition 
of the selected information asymmetry proxies has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the extent of EM. In particular, the results suggest that 
firms for which investors have more information are less likely to manipulate 
accruals for managing their earnings. This is a direct test of Dye (1988) and 
Trueman and Titman (1988), as well as Schipper (1989) suggesting that the 
presence of information asymmetry is a necessary precondition for EM. This 
study also following the works of Richardson (2000) in the USA and Cheng 
(2006) in Taiwan. The study results are consistent with the theoretical and 
empirical literature that is discussed above. 
There are several reasons to expect that information asymmetry affects 
managers’ EM decisions. First, more information available about the firm may 
help investors distinguish the managed component of reported earnings from 
the pre-managed numbers, and therefore may make EM more transparent. In 
such a situation potential benefits of EM will diminish and with respect to the 
expected costs of EM (especially opportunistic EM) there will be no rational 
reason for managers to engaging in EM. On the contrary, when information 
asymmetry is high, investors may not have the necessary information to undo 
the managed earnings. This situation may be evidence of shareholders without 
sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor 
managers’ actions, which may give rise to the practice of EM. In this way, firms 
may smooth or otherwise manage earnings informatively when information 
asymmetry is high in order to signal the expected level of a firm’s permanent 
earnings. Second, the market may rely less on reported earnings when investors 
already have a lot of information about the firm, which in turn reduces the 
potential benefit of EM, and therefore mitigates EM incentives. Third, more 
information about the firm may facilitate better corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, the board of directors may be more likely to step in 
if they have more information that reflects the adverse consequences of 
managers’ costly EM. Finally, the information uncertainty associated with firms 
with low information availability may serve as an additional incentive for 
managers to manipulate earnings because information uncertainty may 
exacerbate investors’ overconfidence and it is associated with greater potential 
benefit for managers or their companies like as greater equity pricing (Jiang, 
Lee & Zhang, 2005;  Zhang, 2006).  
Evidence from this paper suggests that information about the firm and firm 
earnings may limit the extent of EM occurrence. There may also be outside 
monitors who curtail management action and management’s accounting 
choices. Evidence of such monitoring within a particular firm may be the 
proportion and strength of outside members of the board of directors, the 
strength of the audit committee, the focused shareholders (e.g., labour unions, 
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firm suppliers, and similar), and shareholders that hold a large proportion of the 
company shares. Furthermore, this study is also of value to policy makers. EM 
has attracted more and more attention from the regulators, particularly after the 
high-profile meltdowns of several big companies in the world.  Given the severe 
adverse consequences that earnings manipulations can lead to, regulators have 
started to take actions to curb opportunistic EM. Reducing the discretion that 
managers have in accounting choices through setting more standards and 
regulations may be one solution. But an unintended consequence of this type of 
policy is that it may reduce the general usefulness of accounting earnings, given 
that managers sometimes use their discretion to signal their private information 
(for example see Subramanyam 1996). Furthermore, curbing EM by restricting 
managers’ choices is very unlikely to succeed because managers can always 
circumvent regulations using innovative accounting (or creative accounting) 
methods and transaction structuring. If transparent information flows in, the 
capital markets can attenuate the incentives that managers have for EM, 
regulatory bodies should probably focus more on promoting more efficient 
dissemination of firm-specific information in the market. For getting more 
information flow in the capital markets, one should insist on the role of 
information intermediaries such as capital market related media, financial 
analysers, powerful brokerage firms, investment banks, financial and credit 
ranking companies and so on. In Iran these factors do not work well and the 
financial and investment consultancy industry totally is weak, therefore related 
financial phenomena such as herding behaviour and rumour based stock trading 
is common (Keshavarz & Rezaei, 2011; Saeedi and Farahanian, 2012). So there 
is more information asymmetry surrounding TSE listed companies and this 
circumstance may give rise the EM as showed by this research empirical results. 
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